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commercial plants. The various biomass gasifica-
tion technologies are, hence, largely untried. 
In such early phases of development, there are 
generic uncertainties facing investors in terms 
of technology, markets and institutions. 1 These 
uncertainties also abound in this case and risk 
delaying or even jeopardizing progress towards 
commercial plants. This calls into question how 
policy may continue to support the development 
of a technological field which is seen as one, 
of many, that may help us reduce the threat of 
climate change. 2 They also raise questions about 
the realism of EU’s expectations of the time scale 
involved in creating a substantial supply of biofu-
els from lignocellulosic feedstock (see Chapter 
4 on biomass resources and Chapter 6, Figures 
6.7-6.9, on conversion efficiencies). The purpose 
1  Rosenberg, N., (1996). Uncertainty and Technological 
Change, in: Landau, R., Taylor, T., Wright, G. (Eds.), The 
Mosaic of Economic Growth. Stanford University Press, 
Stanford, California, pp. 334-355.
2  Our starting point is that synthetic fuels produced 
through gasifying biomass is an important technology for 
reducing emissions of GHG in the transport sector and it is, 
therefore, of great social interest to develop the technology 
(see also Chapter 7).
INTRODUCTION
A core technology in biorefinieries is that of 
biomass gasification (see Chapter 2). Over 
the last three decades, experiments have been 
undertaken where different applications have 
been explored. In the 1980s, gasified biomass 
replaced oil in some lime kilns in the paper and 
pulp industry and experiments were later made 
with electricity production. The current focus 
(and the focus of this chapter) is on synthetic 
fuels from biomass gasification. Within the EU 
there are nine prominent demonstration facilities, 
centred on three dominant technological trajec-
tories, in the process of being realized in Austria, 
Finland, Germany and Sweden. 
Each demonstration plant is at the heart of an 
alliance consisting of a wide range of firms, 
institutes and universities. Whereas many of 
these plants are well under way, none of them 
have yet completed the initial demonstration 
phase for production of synthetic fuels. Moreo-
ver, this phase is followed by a dramatic, and 
very costly, up-scaling of the plants to full scale 
semi-commercial demonstrations and, eventually, 
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biomass, and a wide range of synthetic fuels may 
be produced from the gas, e.g. FT-fuels, hydro-
gen, dimethylether (DME), methane (i.e. substitute 
natural gas, SNG) and methanol, see Figure 9.1. 
To some extent, biomass gasification can draw 
upon the knowledge base of fossil fuel gasifica-
tion. However, both the physical and chemical 
properties of biomass are different from coal, oil 
and natural gas. The demands on the feeding 
system, reactor design as well as the downstream 
processes are, therefore, different. Producing 
a synthetic fuel based on biomass gasification 
consequently means that a set of additional 
competences related to feeding, reactor design, 
cleaning, conditioning and catalysis of the gas are 
required. Attempts to solve the technical chal-
lenges of biomass gasification, and associated 
uncertainties, are currently pursued along three 
trajectories - see Figure 9.1 where the technical 
challenges are marked in grey and described in 
italics. 5
The Entrained Flow (EF) trajectory draws primar-
ily on technologies that have been developed 
for oil and coal gasification. It involves gasifying 
biomass with oxygen under high temperature 
5  These nine projects were identified in 2008 through 
an extensive literature review and interviews with industry 
experts. This implies that that some important but more 
recent projects are excluded. See Hellsmark, H. (2010). 
Unfolding the formative phase of gasified biomass in the 
European Union – The role of system builders in realising 
the potential of second-generation transportation fuels from 
biomass. Doctoral thesis, Department of Energy and Environ-
ment, Chalmers University of Technology, Göteborg. 
of this chapter is, therefore, to identify policy chal-
lenges and discuss options for moving from the 
current small scale pilot and demonstration plants 
to a larger scale diffusion of gasified biomass in 
the EU in the course of the next decades.
Knowledge of the three technological trajectories 
and of the actors engaged in these is essential 
for our policy analysis. In the next section, we 
describe, therefore, the technologies associated 
with the current demonstration projects, identify 
the main technical uncertainties associated 
with these and the coalitions of actors that are 
formed around the plants. We then address the 
size of the financial risks for investors stemming 
from technical and market related uncertainties 
and discuss different policy instruments which 
can reduce the effects of these uncertainties for 
investors. 3 
TECHNOLOGY, DEMONSTRATION 
PROJECTS AND SUPPORTING ALLIANCES
Gasification technology rests on a set of techno-
logical capabilities associated with the thermal 
conversion of carbon based fuels to a gaseous 
product with a usable heating value4. Many 
types of feedstocks can, in principle, be used, 
e.g. municipal waste, oil, coal, natural gas and 
3  This chapter is based on Hellsmark, H., Jacobsson, S., 
(2012). Realising the potential of gasified biomass in the 
European Union—Policy challenges in moving from demon-
stration plants to a larger scale diffusion. Energy Policy 41, 
507-518.
4  Higman, C., van der Burgt, M., (2008). Gasification. Gulf 
Professional Publishing, Burlington, USA.
Figure 9.1 The three main trajectories for biomass gasification and main technical challenges (marked in grey and 
described in italics). The three main trajectories are: (1) Entrained Flow (EF) gasification, (2) Fluidized Bed (FB) gas-
ification, and (3) Fast Internal Circulating Fluidized Bed (FICFB). Source: Hellsmark (2010).
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and steam. Since it is pressurized, it can be 
operated on a large scale, while the atmospheric 
process (FICFB) can be operated on a smaller 
scale without an external oxygen supply. Fluidized 
bed technologies are well suited to the physical 
and chemical properties of biomass and feeding 
biomass to the gasification reactor poses, there-
fore, few problems, although there are limited 
experiences with pressurized feeding systems. 
More importantly, the gas from both processes is 
more contaminated by tars, alkaloids, hydrocar-
bons, benzene, nitrogen and toluene, etc. than 
the gas from EF gasification. For transport fuels, 
ultra clean gas is required and there are limited 
and pressure. The process results in a relatively 
clean gas that can be synthesised into advanced 
chemicals and transportation fuels with, more 
or less, existing downstream coal technologies. 
The drawback with this route, however, is that a 
system for pre-treating the biomass is necessary 
and such systems are currently not commercially 
available.
The two other trajectories have evolved from 
combustion technology into pressurized Fluidized 
Bed (FB) and atmospheric Fast Internal Circulat-
ing Fluidized Bed (FICFB) gasification. In the FB 
system, biomass reacts with a mixture of oxygen 
Figure 9.2 Overview of major gasification projects in Europe pursued for the production of synthetic fuels from 
biomass. When relevant, methods for pre-treatment are mentioned in italics. Acronyms used in the figure are: EF: 
Entrained Flow, FB=Fluidised Bed, FICFB=Fast Internal Circulating Fluidised Bed, SNG=Synthetic Natural Gas, 
DME= dimethyl ether, MtG=Methanol to Gasoline. Source: Hellsmark (2010), see footnote 5.
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potential synergies can be found (see Chapters 2 
and 5), to the development of new infrastructure 
and vehicles. However, judging from the ability 
to form alliances hitherto, this coordination may 
not be a primary obstacle. A more significant 
obstacle arguably lies in managing the substantial 
technical uncertainties indicated above and the 
even more substantial market uncertainties.
TECHNICAL UNCERTAINTIES FACING 
INVESTORS
The nine projects described above are all in 
the process of moving from the pilot stage to 
constructing the first demonstration units. The 
cost of these plants ranges from 1 to 100 MEUR. 
However, not all of them include demonstration of 
the synthesis process, see Table 9.1. 
The subsequent shift to pre-commercial dem-
onstration plants and fully commercial plants 
involves dramatic up-scaling of the size and cost 
of the plants. For instance, for the Chemrec plant 
(EF gasification of black liquor in Sweden) this 
will involve an increase in output from less than 
0.1 PJ per year8 (28 MEUR) in a demonstration 
plant that was constructed (but not taken in 
operation) in 2010 to 4 PJ per year (300 MEUR) 
in a pre-commercial plant (originally planned to 
be ready by 2012-2013)9 and to 8 PJ per year 
(400 MEUR) in a commercial plant to be ready for 
operation by 2015.10 The investment costs would 
typically be between 400-800 MEUR for com-
mercial plants with a production capacity in the 
range of 8 PJ per year (0.2 Mtoe per year).
Throughout the up-scaling process, uncertainties 
of a technical nature are likely to remain although 
they are expected to get smaller as the scaling 
process proceeds. On the other hand, the sums 
involved are much larger, so technical uncertain-
ties will remain a serious obstacle to investment. 
Conventionally, demonstration plants receive 
investment subsidies from governments but 
8  Approximately 1.5 ktoe (tonnes of oil equivalent), 1 Mtoe 
equals 41.9 PJ. 
9  Recent information indicates that this decision has not 
yet been taken which means the time-scale is shifted forward 
2-3 years, at best.
10  Rudberg, J., (2008). Interview with Jonas Rudberg, CEO 
Chemrec, Stockholm, 2008-12-03.
experiences with producing such a gas with con-
ventional cleaning methods. Producing transport 
fuel means, therefore, that competences related 
to cleaning, conditioning and catalysis of the gas 
are required. 6
These competences reside not within the boiler 
industry (mastering combustion technology) but 
within the chemical industry, associated institutes 
and university departments. This means that firms 
have to acquire the required competences or 
operate in alliances. A feature of the technological 
field of biomass gasification for the production of 
synthetic fuels is, indeed, that such alliances are 
formed. 7 These alliances include actors along the 
whole value chain, e.g. actors in the agricultural 
and forestry sectors supplying the feedstock, the 
capital goods industry, suppliers of gas (including 
the petrochemical industry) and manufacturers of 
transport equipment.
Nine such alliances are found in Figure 9.2. Each 
of these focuses on a specific pilot or demonstra-
tion plant. These projects target different types of 
biomass as feedstock, employ different gasifica-
tion technologies (all of the three trajectories 
discussed above are represented) and aim for 
different types of synthetic fuels such as FT-
fuels, DME, methanol and methane. Some of the 
projects are in a pilot phase whereas others are in 
an early demonstration phase, see Table 9.1. 
As the development of the technological field 
progresses towards commercially sized dem-
onstration plants, we expect to see challenges 
for private actors to coordinate simultaneous 
investments along the entire value chain. These 
coordination and development activities range 
from increased biomass production to technol-
ogy integration in the pulp and paper industry, 
in refineries or in other existing industries where 
6  For a longer discussion of these matters, including 
sources, see Hellsmark, H. (2010). Unfolding the formative 
phase of gasified biomass in the European Union – The role 
of system builders in realising the potential of second-gene-
ration transportation fuels from biomass. Doctoral thesis, 
Department of Energy and Environment, Chalmers University 
of Technology, Göteborg.
7  There are also other reasons for forming alliances, such 
as political leverage and securing complementary products 
as well as funding.
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To cover, say, 20 per cent of the total invest-
ment, a funding scheme of an additional 200 
MEUR would, therefore, be required. An obvious 
policy challenge is, thus, to devise large enough 
programmes that can induce investors to face 
the technical uncertainties in moving to the first 
commercial plants. Such programmes must have 
a long-term commitment from policy makers in 
order to be effective. 
It is a complex process to produce synthetic 
fuels from biomass gasification and significant 
delays are common. Given all uncertainties it is 
reasonable to assume that it will take at least 
three years13, probably more, from when a first 
(and smaller) demonstration plant has been 
constructed until an investor is willing to commit 
to a (larger) pre-commercial demonstration plant. 
Investors would, thus, be able to decide whether 
to start constructing the first pre-commercial 
demonstration plants no earlier than 2014. It may 
13  The figure is a very rough estimate based on previous 
and similar gasification projects, see Hellsmark, H., (2010). 
Unfolding the formative phase of gasified biomass in the 
European Union – The role of system builders in realising 
the potential of second-generation transportation fuels from 
biomass. Doctoral thesis, Department of Energy and Environ-
ment, Chalmers University of Technology, Göteborg. for a 
longer discussion.
government sponsored risk absorption schemes 
may also be applied, reducing the risks of the 
lending bank. 
Given the costs involved, any government pro-
gramme has to be very large. In the Swedish 
case, for instance, a funding scheme for demon-
stration of synthetic fuels from gasified biomass 
and other energy technologies instituted in 2008 
involves about 875 MSEK (87 MEUR) over a 
period of 3-4 years. 11 This scheme represents a 
major increase in the availability of such funding. 
Through this scheme, the company Chemrec has 
been granted 500 MSEK (about 50 MEUR) and 
Gothenburg Energy 222 MSEK (about 20 MEUR) 
to complete the pre-commercial demonstration 
phase, see Table 9.1. 12
Continuing with the case of Sweden, assuming 
that one plant from each of the three trajecto-
ries will be constructed in the next phase, an 
additional 1,000 MEUR will have to be raised. 
11  Swedish Energy Agency, 2008. Utlysning: Intressean-
mälan för demonstration och kommersialisering av andra 
generationens drivmedel och annan energiteknik. Dnr: 410-
2008-003385. Eskilstuna.
12  The Gothenburg Energy plant is a variant of the TU-
Vienna/Repotec technology and represents the pre-commer-
cial plant on the first row in Table 9.1.
Table 9.1 Industry estimates of costs and time line for the major development projects in the EU.  
Source: Hellsmark and Jacobsson (2012). The table indicates when the various alliances predict that their proj-
ects will pass through the different phases. The year refers to completed construction, not to plant in operation. 
The pilot, demonstration and some of the pre-commercial plants will not operate in a continuous mode. It is, 
therefore, not meaningful to convert a physical size (MW) into a production volume (PJ/year) for these plants. In 
the case of Värnamo, a demonstration plant was taken into operation for the production of heat and electricity 
in 1993. Attempts to reconstruct the plant for demonstrating the production of synthesis gas have been made 
since early 2000, but these have not been successful.
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per year by 2030 it would involve building some 
150 plants, each supplying 8 PJ per year (0.2 
Mtoe per year) of fuel. The total value of the fuel 
supplied would be about 15-30 billion EUR per 
year, and the total investment 60-120 billion EUR. 
Hence, a subsequent large scale transforma-
tion of the fuel market would entail huge market 
opportunities for both fuel and capital goods 
suppliers. 
Yet, there are very substantial uncertainties facing 
investors with respect to market formation that 
must be addressed if the potential of gasified 
biomass is to be realised. The main market uncer-
tainty is threats from substitutes in that invest-
ments that may eventually deliver synthetic fuels 
from biomass gasification have to compete not 
only with the lower cost sugar and starch based 
biofuels but also with fossil based alternatives, 
conventional fuels and maybe also with hydrogen 
and electricity.17
With respect to conventional fossil based fuels, 
potential investors would, in the absence of a 
deployment policy, face very substantial market 
uncertainties for both the initial nine plants and 
for the subsequent 100 or more plants. These 
uncertainties are illustrated in Figure 9.3. In the 
figure, we distinguish between low and high cost 
levels (10-20 EUR/GJ) for producing synthetic 
fuels from biomass gasification.18 
These cost levels can be set against past and 
predicted prices of oil. The average world oil 
price from 1970 to 2009 was 36 USD (in 2008 
dollars). In the World Energy Outlook, IEA (2009) 
19 predicts the real oil price by 2030 in two main 
scenarios. In the reference scenario, it is set at 
115 USD/barrel and in the high price scenario it 
is increased to 150 USD/barrel.
17  However, other market uncertainties also apply such as 
the size of the potential market (Chapter 3) and the availabil-
ity of future biomass resources for energy purposes (Chapter 
4).
18  These cost levels were provided by advocates of the 
different projects in Table 9.1 and Figure 9.2; they are further 
discussed in Hellsmark (2010).
19  IEA, 2009. World Energy Outlook. International Energy 
Agency, Paris.
then take three to four years to construct and 
demonstrate these larger plants which mean that 
an investment decision for the first commercial-
sized plant cannot be taken until 2017-18. The 
first commercial fuels from biomass gasification 
cannot, therefore, be expected to be available 
earlier than about 2020. 
In sum, the high risks, large capital expenditures 
and long time scale involved in developing the 
complex and large-scale technology for produc-
ing fuels from biomass gasification dictates that, 
from an investor’s perspective, it is vital that 
policy intervention has a long term perspective 
and involve substantial sums.14 The expected time 
scale involved in shifting from the current demon-
stration phase to a situation where synthetic fuels 
from biomass may begin to have an impact on the 
market may also have to be adjusted. 
MARKET UNCERTAINTIES
The EU Directive 2009/28/EC mandates a ten 
per cent share of renewable transportation fuels 
(by energy content) by 2020, which translates 
into approximately 1,300 PJ per year (30 Mtoe per 
year) based on the road transport fuel consump-
tion in 2005-2010. 15 On the basis on the analysis 
in the previous section we expect only a small 
share in the form of fuels from gasified biomass. 16
Assuming, however, that the supply of synthetic 
fuels from biomass gasification takes off after 
2020 and captures a market of, say, 1,300 PJ 
14  Committee on Climate Change (2010, p. 9)) in the UK 
explains why public intervention must go beyond addressing 
negative externalities: “Investment in innovation is character-
ised by uncertainty – i.e. it is known that investments may fail, 
but a precise probability cannot be placed on failure. Unable 
to calculate precise risks, investors will act upon imperfect 
information and will often be risk averse. Long time scales 
for investment and deployment of technologies increase the 
length of time investments are at risk and increase risk aver-
sion. For high capital cost investments, frequent in the energy 
sector, this may be a particular barrier.” 
15  Eurostat, 2012. Energy statistics, . European 
Commission.
16  Even though perhaps unrealistically, we assume that all of 
the projects in Table 1 are realized and at least one commer-
cial scale plant will be built for each project, the combined 
production capacity of these commercial scale plants would 
be approximately 60 PJ per year. This amounts to less than 
0.5 per cent of the EU transport fuel market. Hence, synthetic 
fuels from gasified biomass may be available by 2020, but 
the volumes cannot be expected to be significant by then.
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into a pre-commercial demonstration phase and, 
eventually, form a significant supply capacity for 
synthetic fuels based on biomass. 
CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING POLICY 
OPTIONS
Reducing these technical and market uncertain-
ties is the main challenge ahead for policy makers 
and we will discuss various means of doing so. 
We will focus on market uncertainties since 
investment subsidies or risk absorption schemes 
(managing technical uncertainties) may not be 
enough to stimulate investments even for the first 
set of plants (about 4 billion EUR, see Table 1) 
due to the very large market uncertainties. Before 
we discuss the usefulness of various policy 
instruments, we need, however, to specify the 
assessment criteria, in particular what effective-
ness entails. 
Effectiveness, efficiency and equity are three 
commonly used criteria for assessing policy 
options. 22 The effectiveness of an instrument is 
assessed by its ability to meet a certain target, 
e.g. ten per cent renewable transportation fuels 
by 2020 or hundred per cent by 2050. 
22  Jacobsson, S., et al. (2009). EU renewable energy sup-
port policy: Faith or facts? Energy Policy 37, 2143-2146.
Figure 9.3 provides a base for assessing the 
financial magnitude of the market uncertainties 
caused by uncertain future oil price. It points 
to the hypothetic annual losses (or gains) for 
investors if a 10 per cent market for synthetic 
fuels from biomass gasification (1,300 PJ per 
year) is realized in the future. Investors would lose 
more than 20 billion EUR if that market were to 
be realised at a production cost of 20 EUR/GJ 
(corresponding to 163 USD/barrel) and with an 
oil price at an historic average of 35 USD/barrel 
(Arrow 1 in Figure 9.3).20 On the other hand, with 
production costs of 10 EUR/GJ and with the oil 
price at 150 USD/barrel, investors would gain 
more than 10 billion EUR (Arrow 2). 
In sum, there are not only substantial technical 
but also market related uncertainties for all the 
actors that need to participate to realize the 
potential. Moreover, these uncertainties are not 
of a short term character but are expected to stay 
for many years. Only very powerful and durable21 
incentives may, therefore, be expected to induce 
the necessary investments to take the industry 
20  We here assume an exchange rate or 0.75 EUR/USD.
21  The time scale involved here is not unique. Mobile tele-
phony dates back to the 1950s and a large scale diffusion 
took place in the second half of the 1990s. The first offshore 
wind farm was built in 1991 and in 2011, 14 TWh was sup-
plied in Europe and the European Wind Energy Association 
expects a large scale diffusion to begin after 2020.
Figure 9.3 A tentative assessment of financial risk for commercially sized plants – annual losses or gains in real-
izing a 10 per cent market for synthetic fuels from biomass gasification by 2030 (billion EUR). Arrows 1 and 2 are 
discussed in the text.
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Arguably, for the period from now until 2020, a 
first goal would be to move from smaller dem-
onstration plants to having fully commercially 
sized plants from the different trajectories up and 
running. Hence, a first goal is to ‘put the various 
technologies on the shelf’. 26 This is likely to be 
achieved no earlier than 2020. In the next stage, 
a second goal for 2030 could be set at 20 per 
cent renewable transportation fuels, of which half 
could be synthetic fuels from biomass gasifica-
tion. This would amount to about 1,300 PJ (30 
Mtoe) or about 150 plants.27 
This means that policies must be assessed with 
respect to their ability to meet these two goals 
within the specified time frame. To be effective, 
we will argue that several alternative technologies 
need to be developed. This is, of course, inherent 
in the first goal but also, arguably, a necessity if 
the second goal is to be reached.
The different technological trajectories do not 
represent conventional ‘competing designs’, i.e. 
design configurations that can fully substitute for 
each other. 28 The applications of the technolo-
gies in the three trajectories to specific contexts 
are more or less constrained in their potential. 
For instance, feedstocks vary in their availability, 
e.g. the use of EF with black liquor as feedstock 
is constrained by the number of pulp mills with 
chemical process technology (in contrast to 
mechanical). Moreover, there are joint production 
opportunities in the pulp and paper (Chapters 2 
and 5), petro-chemical (Chapter 2) and district 
heating industries (Chapter 8) but, of course, 
these are limited by the size of these industries 
and by existing technical infrastructure.
The lowest cost level for producing synthetic 
fuels from biomass gasification in Europe, based 
on domestic biomass resources, can be expected 
to be found in Sweden and Finland due to large 
heat sinks and a paper and pulp industry in which 
26  This is broadly in line with the 450 Policy Scenario in IEA 
(2008) if EU maintains its share of the global biofuel market.
27  This is broadly in line with the 450 Policy Scenario in IEA 
(2008) if EU maintains its share of the global biofuel market.
28  Utterback, J.M., (1994). Mastering the dynamics of inno-
vation: how companies can seize opportunities in the face 
of technological change. Harvard Business School Press, 
Boston.
Efficiency23, or cost-effectiveness, is assessed 
by the social costs involved in meeting a given 
target. There are two challenges in applying this 
criterion. First, by definition, it makes sense to 
assess the cost-effectiveness of instruments 
only if they are expected to lead to the achieve-
ment of a certain target, i.e. if the effectiveness 
criterion is fulfilled (see below). Second, minimis-
ing costs, not in the short term, but over several 
decades means that we need to focus on what 
policy instruments can be expected to generate 
the lowest cost solution over the whole period, 
taking technical change into account. This rests, 
to a large extent, on the innovative capabilities in 
the capital goods industry. Hence, applying this 
criterion requires that we understand the impact 
of various instruments on the behaviour of the 
capital goods sector and its ability, in turn, to 
drive technical change. 
The third criterion is equity which is a factor in 
creating social legitimacy for policies supporting 
new technology. Excess profits threaten legiti-
macy and must be avoided.24 
In order to assess the effectiveness of a policy 
instrument, we need to specify the goal of 
intervention. As far as we are aware, a goal has 
not been set for the diffusion of synthetic fuels, 
neither in individual countries, nor at the EU level. 
However, as we move beyond 2020, an aggres-
sive strategy to cut emissions is argued to require 
a major increase in the supply of biofuels from 
lignocellulosic feedstock (compare discussion in 
Chapter 4), including synthetic fuels from bio-
mass gasification. 25
What goal should then the effectiveness criterion 
be related to? The effectiveness of any policy 
instrument must be assessed, as is evident from 
the sections above, by its ability to influence 
the strategic decisions of actors to explore 
and develop alternative technical solutions, fill 
the whole value chain and coordinate actions. 
23  We here refer to economic efficiency. See e.g. Chapter 6 
for a discussion of different measures of energy efficiency.
24  Verbruggen, A., (2008). Windfalls and other profits. 
Energy Policy 36, 3249-3251.
25  Page 473, IEA, (2008). World Energy Outlook. Interna-
tional Energy Agency, Paris.
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future of the size of the cap create very large 
uncertainties for investors who have to estimate 
income streams over two or more decades. 
Hence, in terms of Figure 9.3, the market uncer-
tainty is very high indeed, which strongly discour-
ages investments.
A quota for biofuels is currently operating in e.g. 
Germany. A general quota induces, however, an 
expansion of the least cost options first, i.e. first 
generation biofuels.30 Whereas the desirability of 
conventional biofuels from crops is questioned (in 
terms of both its ability to reduce emissions and 
its use of arable land), the potential is large, espe-
cially if we consider import opportunities from 
Latin America and Africa (see also discussion in 
Chapter 4). A general quota would, therefore, not 
be a strong inducement mechanism for firms to 
invest in up-scaling and further developing bio-
mass gasification for the production of synthetic 
transportation fuels. 
To stimulate such development, the European 
Commission has decided that the “... contribu-
tion made by biofuels produced from municipal 
waste, residues, non food cellulosic material, and 
ligno-cellulosic material shall be considered twice 
that made by other biofuels” . 31 Such a double 
counting would, of course, mean that a 10 per 
cent goal for synthetic fuels (see above) can be 
reached by supplying 650 PJ per year only. Yet, 
our conclusion of the need for a parallel develop-
ment of the three trajectories in many countries 
holds; as shown above the supply capacity from 
lower cost options in the Nordic countries is still 
30  Tradable green certificates (TGC) is a more advanced 
form of quota system that has been favoured by the EU 
Commission as a deployment policy in the field of renewable 
electricity (Jacobsson et al., 2009). The core of this policy is, 
as for quota systems in general, to select the currently most 
cost-effective technology and only in a step-wise manner 
introduce more costly technologies. Hence, the aim is to 
avoid a parallel development of technical alternatives with 
different cost levels. It cannot be expected to fulfil the effec-
tiveness criterion as this requires creating markets for all the 
three trajectories in parallel.
31  In addition, the EC proposes that when Member States 
design their support systems they may give “ ... additional 
benefits to ... biofuels made from waste, residues, non-food 
cellulosic material, ligno-cellulosic material and algae, as well 
as non-irrigated plants grown in arid areas to fight desertifi-
cation ... ” (EC, 2009, p.26).
the technologies (all three trajectories) can be 
integrated. The potential in a European market 
perspective is, however, quite limited. Ekbom et 
al. 29 (Table 7.1) show that the potential for FT-
diesel production using black liquor is about 80 
PJ for Sweden and Finland together. This would 
substitute for about 20 per cent of the petrol and 
diesel consumption in these two countries. Even 
if production were to be doubled by the inclusion 
of fuel production in mechanical paper mills and 
district heating systems, meeting a goal of 1300 
PJ by 2030, and going beyond it, would certainly 
require that the higher cost applications of the 
technologies would also need to be developed 
and exploited. 
With the long time taken to go from small dem-
onstrations to fully commercial plants, i.e. ‘putting 
the technologies on the shelf’ and the extension 
of that time axis in their subsequent diffusion, 
effectiveness involves creating markets for all the 
three trajectories applied to different contexts, 
which then will develop in parallel rather than 
sequentially, jointly gaining market shares from 
fossil alternatives and not from each other.
POLICY OPTIONS FOR REDUCING 
MARKET UNCERTAINTIES 
Having established a key criterion for assessing 
the effectiveness of various policy instruments, 
we will now proceed to discuss a number of 
options where we assume that the policy instru-
ments operate at the EU level. The main instru-
ments of interest are a general quota for all types 
of biofuels, separate quotas for conventional 
biofuels from crops, and for biofuels from ligno-
cellulosic material and waste (sometimes referred 
to as ‘first’ and ‘second generation’ of biofuels, 
respectively), and finally separate feed-in tariffs 
for many different conversion pathways. Before 
we turn to these, we will comment on another 
option, namely the inclusion of the transport sec-
tor in the ETS. This is sometimes advocated as a 
solution but it is plain that the volatility of the price 
for emission permits and the highly uncertain 
29  Ekbom, T. et al. (2003). Technical and Commercial Feasi-
bility Study of Black Liquor Gasification with Methanol/DME 
Production as Motor Fuels for Automotive Uses - BLGMF. 
Nykomb Synergetics AB, Stockholm.
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An additional problem with a quota is the very 
substantial information requirements for a central 
planner in setting the quota, both its initial level 
and its escalation. Basically, today nobody can 
with certainty say when the first commercial 
plant will be operational. It is even more difficult 
to judge how quickly the supply capacity in the 
capital goods industry can grow – it depends not 
only on the strategic choice of a number of capital 
goods firms but also on the access to specialised 
skills in a range of areas, including gasification 
and catalysis.34 
Feed-in with cost covering payment that differs 
between technologies (and contexts of applica-
tion) is a well proven regulatory framework to 
stimulate the diffusion and further development of 
a range of technologies in parallel, i.e. a feed-in 
tariff is expected to score high on the effective-
ness criterion. Just as double counting in a 
quota system, a feed-in tariff may stimulate more 
expensive, but higher performing, alternatives 
through setting higher prices. In principle, excess 
profits may be avoided by a careful price setting 
routine. Such prices, which are normally set for a 
period of 15-20 years, would need to be adjusted 
for fluctuating feedstock prices. 
However, there are two major problems with this 
instrument, at least at this stage. First, effective-
ness necessitates that one tariff is set for each 
technological trajectory (and specific context). It 
is not, however, possible to calculate costs with 
the required precision without experience with full 
size commercial plants. Second, there is not, as 
yet, competition in the capital goods sector within 
each trajectory which means that setting a feed-in 
price would involve negotiations between govern-
ment and monopolistic suppliers with access to 
superior information. This opens up for problems 
with respect to the equity criterion. 
A dedicated quota for synthetic fuels from 
lignocellulosic materials and waste appears to 
be a more attractive option as prices do not 
need to be set for 15-20 years but may evolve as 
34  A recurrent theme in interviews with capital goods suppli-
ers and other firms was the lack of specialised competences 
in the field.
quite limited in comparison.32
A double counting of fuels from lignocellulosic 
materials and waste would provide an added 
incentive to investors in fuels from gasified 
biomass that better reflect their performance 
in terms of CO2 emissions. Market uncertainty 
remains high, however, and is magnified by the 
interdependency with the price of conventional 
fuel. Assuming that both first and second genera-
tion biofuels are blended into conventional fuels, 
the competitiveness of the latter vis-à-vis the 
former will depend on the price of conventional 
fuels. If that price increases, first generation 
biofuels gains a competitive edge simply since it, 
in terms of volume, replaces about twice as much 
conventional fuels as the synthetic alternatives. 
33 Potential investors, thus, have to consider the 
future prices (over decades) of not only different 
kinds of biofuels but also of conventional fuels. 
This adds uncertainty to any investment analysis.
A separate blending quota for synthetic fuels from 
lignocellulosic materials and waste would alleviate 
the problem of interdependency with the price 
of conventional fuel and take away the market 
uncertainty with respect to competition with more 
mature biofuels. As and when the first larger 
plants have been taken into operation, a predeter-
mined quota could be applied. In order to stimu-
late a supply capacity in the Nordic countries, a 
unified EU blending quota for second generation 
biofuels may have to be coupled to trading oppor-
tunities, i.e. an export from Sweden and Finland 
to other countries (as is specified in Directive 
2009/28/EC). Integrating the Nordic and German 
markets may, however, lead to equity problems. 
As discussed above, the estimated cost levels of 
synthetic fuels from biomass gasification differ a 
great deal, to the advantage of Swedish and Finn-
ish suppliers. With an integration of the markets, 
price levels would be expected to be equalised, 
with potential huge excess profits gained by the 
Nordic suppliers. 
32  Double counting would, of course, easily lead us to set 
a higher goal in terms of percentage of fuel consumption, 
maintaining the goal of 1300 PJ per year.
33  Choren, 2007. Suggestion presented on slideshow: 
CHOREN Stellungnahme Förderpolitik Biokraftstoffe_2007 
12 engl 01, provided by Mattias Rudloff at Choren, Freiberg.
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experience is gained. Yet, as explained above, 
there are very considerable information problems 
for a central authority to set a quota over a longer 
period of time. Moreover, it remains doubtful if a 
promise by current politicians of a future quota 
would be enough to convince firms that a market 
will materialise with prices that will cover costs. 
In sum, none of the currently discussed policy 
options come out as a strong candidate, at least 
not at this stage of development of the industry. 
An option would be to implement a ‘bridging 
policy’ that reduces the information needs among 
policy makers while taking away the market 
uncertainties for the first set of plants. One 
alternative would be to implement plant-specific 
tax exemptions (increasing the price competitive-
ness of synthetic fuels from biomass gasification) 
coupled to guaranteed market and off-take price 
from public sector customer or, possibly, traders 
or petrochemical firms. Such a price would, in 
effect, be a miniaturised plant specific feed-in 
tariff. The possible drawback in terms of informa-
tion asymmetries would remain but be limited to a 
few specific investments. 
With a bridging policy, the market uncertainty (in 
terms of relative price level vis-à-vis conventional 
fuels) is absorbed by the customer but the tax 
exemption would reduce the size of the potential 
losses. At the same time, as argued above, 
some of the technical risks would need to be 
absorbed by society at large. This limited and 
temporary construction would take the capital 
goods industry through to the stage where the 
first commercially sized plants are built, reduc-
ing technical uncertainties and completing the 
respective value chains. It would also give the 
added benefit of generating a pool of experi-
ence and competences on which a longer term 
policy can be based, be it a dedicated quota for 
lignocellulosic fuels or a targeted feed-in tariff. Of 
course, a possible outcome of this policy would 
be that a learning process reveals that gasifica-
tion of biomass, or a particular trajectory, is not 
viable. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The purpose of this chapter was to identify policy 
challenges and discuss options for moving from 
the current small scale pilot and demonstration 
plants in the European Union to a larger scale 
diffusion of gasified biomass.
In the EU, three main technological trajectories 
are being explored to gasify biomass. Nine alli-
ances of firms, institutes and universities centre 
on their own demonstration plant in which one of 
these trajectories is applied to a specific context. 
These plants use different production processes 
and different feed stocks for producing different 
types of synthetic fuels. For these alliances, the 
challenge is to complete the demonstrations and 
then scale them to supply synthetic fuels from the 
first commercial-sized plants by about 2020. 
From an investor’s perspective, a commitment to 
synthetic fuels from biomass gasification involves 
facing a number of technical uncertainties that 
can only be reduced through building demon-
stration plants. Demonstration programmes 
that absorb technical uncertainties need to 
be supplemented by policies that ensure that 
markets are formed. There is an abundance of 
different public policy instruments to form markets 
and assessing the usefulness of each of them 
requires that clear criteria are developed. The 
effectiveness of an instrument is assessed by its 
ability to meet a certain target whereas efficiency, 
or cost-effectiveness, refers to meeting this target 
at lowest cost. Equity is a third credible criterion.
Discussing the effectiveness of an instrument 
requires that a goal is specified. We suggested, 
as an example, that an EU goal for 2030 could be 
set at 20 per cent renewable transportation fuels, 
out of which half could be synthetic fuels from 
biomass gasification. This would amount to about 
1,300 PJ per year (30 Mtoe per year), involving 
some 150 plants. Reaching this goal neces-
sitates the coexistence of a range of technolo-
gies applied to different contexts and with quite 
different cost levels. With the inherently long 
time axis in moving towards the first commercial 
scale plants, and the subsequent multiplication 
of these, effectiveness therefore involves creating 
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is absorbed by the customer but the tax exemp-
tion would reduce the size of the potential losses. 
This bridge would a) ensure a market; b) demon-
strate a strong commitment to the technology; 
c) take the capital goods industry through to the 
stage where the first commercially sized plants 
are built, reducing the technical uncertainties and 
populating the respective value chains; d) gener-
ate a pool of experience and competences on 
which a longer term policy can be based. A final 
advantage with this temporary and limited policy 
is to learn more about the viability of gasified 
biomass.
markets for all three trajectories applied to a 
range of contexts which then will develop in paral-
lel, rather than in sequence.
Most of the currently discussed policy instru-
ments fail on this criterion of effectiveness. Equity 
issues would also arise. A way forward is a ‘bridg-
ing policy’ that takes away market uncertainties 
for the first plants whilst reducing the information 
needs among policy makers. Such a bridge could 
be built by implementing a small number of plant-
specific tax exemptions coupled to guaranteed 
market and off-take price. The market uncertainty 
